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This paper examines how macroeconomic policies can be managed to accommodate a large 
inflow of foreign aid to combat the HIV/AIDS epidemic and still maintain macroeconomic 
stability. Because of the daunting scale of this epidemic, funds need to be disbursed urgently in 
order to contain its spread, yet some economists worry that rapidly scaling up foreign assistance 
for this purpose will cause inflation and appreciation of the real exchange rate.  
If such effects occur, they could impair a country’s international competitiveness and endanger 
its growth prospects. However, this paper maintains that such effects can be minimized if 
governments and central banks coordinate fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies. If they 
do, they should be able to both ‘spend’ aid in order to finance larger government programmes 
and ‘absorb’ aid in order to import more real resources. Often, governments that receive foreign 
aid neither spend nor absorb it fully, defeating the basic purpose of development assistance. 
Because governments fear inflation, they are reluctant to finance a significant increase in 
spending on HIV/AIDS programmes even when the funding is available. Central banks are 
reluctant to sell the foreign currency they receive from HIV/AID related aid because they fear 
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that such an action might appreciate the domestic currency. However, if aid-induced spending 
on HIV/AIDS programmes minimizes the adverse impact of the epidemic on human 
capabilities, not only would it combat a grave human development crisis but also it could 
safeguard long-term economic growth.  
Instead of adhering to restrictive macroeconomic policies, governments could target their 
increased spending on productivity-enhancing public investment and central banks could 
amplify the flow of low-cost credit to stimulate private investment. The central banks must 
accept some appreciation of real exchange rate, as only through appreciation are more imports 
possible. However, if the real exchange rate does appreciate excessively to the detriment of 
exports, the central bank can implement means to manage its fluctuations in order to maintain 
competitiveness. Moreover, if a significant proportion of HIV/AIDS funds is used to directly 
finance the import of drugs and medical equipment that are not produced domestically (which is 
often the case), there is likely to be even less impact on inflation or appreciation of the exchange 
rate. 
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1 Introduction:  tackling  HIV/AIDS  as a human development disaster 
Globally, AIDS has killed more than 23 million people. In 2004 alone, more than three 
million people died, and nearly five million people became HIV-positive. An estimated 
40 million people worldwide are now living with HIV and this number continues to 
grow, rising from 35 million in 2001 to 38 million in 2003. With an estimated 15,000 
people contracting the virus each day, HIV has become a huge epidemic. At the rate of 
about 1.5 million infections a year, the number of HIV positive persons globally will be 
over 60 million by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) target year of 2015.1  
While this is frightening, what is more disturbing is its distribution—more than 65 per 
cent of the HIV-positive people live in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 95 per cent of new 
infections occur in the developing world.  
The HIV/AIDS epidemic globally, and in countries of Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, 
is causing a large-scale human development crisis. Although AIDS is a slow killer, an 
estimated 4,000 people die of it every day, contributing to nearly 1.5 million deaths a 
year. Thus, the scale of this crisis requires nothing less than an emergency response of 
unprecedented proportions. 
Impact of the epidemic can also be examined in economic terms. The full economic 
impact of HIV/AIDS in high prevalence countries will become apparent only in the long 
run. As large numbers of children and working age adults become HIV positive, this 
will directly reduce the supply of labour. It also seriously constrains the labourforce 
participation of other members of the household who have to care for sick relatives. 
Through the adverse impacts on educational attainment and the strains on government 
expenditures, the high HIV/AIDS prevalence will impair the long-term growth potential 
of a country. Hence, unless this epidemic is tackled now, the long-run growth of these 
countries will be grievously impaired (see Haacker 2004). 
It is a vicious circle: HIV/AIDS and the human development crisis it precipitates 
adversely affect growth; faltering growth increases poverty, which then heightens the 
risk of infection. As the rate of infection rises, there is a self-reinforcing cumulative 
circular causation of poverty and HIV/AIDS. 
Therefore, whichever perspective one takes—human development crisis or economic 
growth—there is an urgency in dealing with HIV/AIDS. The infection rate needs to be 
capped and then reversed. At the same time, 40 million HIV-positive people need to be 
treated. The task is daunting, involving complex socio-cultural and economic 
challenges.  
On the economic front, one burning issue is financing—how much is needed, what are 
the sources, and how to spend it. The latest UNAIDS estimates show that the cost of a 
comprehensive response to HIV/AIDS in low- and middle-income countries will rise 
from US$9.6–11.3 billion in 2005 to the magnitude of US$14.1–18.8 billion by 2007 
(UNAIDS 2005). In several countries, financing needs for HIV/AIDS programmes 
could rise to 10 per cent of GDP, putting enormous pressure on government budgets. 
Therefore, the financing of essential HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention programmes  
 
                                                 







































































































will require large aid inflows. The international community has already committed a 
large sum to support national efforts. For example, out of about US$6 billion spent 
globally on HIV/AIDS related programmes in 2004, close to US$3.7 billion came from 
international sources (OECD 2005). This represented a near doubling of international 
efforts between 2002 and 2004.2  
Figure 1A 














































































































Percentage increase in external HIV/AIDS funding, 2002-04 
 
 
                                                 
2    Multilateral assistance comes from international agencies, such as the World Bank and UNDP’s 
Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), which are financed by bilateral 
donors and private foundations, such as the Gates and Clinton Foundations. In addition to contributing 
to the GFATM, bilateral donors also fund HIV/AIDS programmes directly. One significant initiative 
is that of the United States. Under the President’s Emergency Plan for HIV/AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), 
the US has committed US$15 billion for 15 countries over five years (2004-08). 
Source: OECD (2005), as reported in Lewis (2005).   3
For many Sub-Saharan African countries in which HIV/AIDS prevalence is very high, 
foreign aid has been the dominant source of funding. As can be seen from Figures 1A 
and 1B, HIV/AIDS related external funding increased significantly in these countries in 
just two years. In the case of Lesotho, for example, the increase was about 1,100 per 
cent. 
Because of this scaling up, donors have expressed concerns about these countries’ 
ability to absorb such a large surge in aid flows. For example, they cite such problems 
as institutional weakness and the lack of critical complementary inputs such as skilled 
manpower. There are also other major concerns, such as the possibility of disincentive 
effects on governments’ resolve to mobilize domestic resources and the vulnerability of 
these countries to the uncertainty of aid flows. A major concern that has recently 
received increased attention is the possibility of large aid-induced macroeconomic 
instability, such as higher inflation and real appreciation of the domestic currency (UN 
Millennium Project 2005: 239-40).3 One way of posing the question is, will the rise in 
inflation and real appreciation of the domestic currency be large enough to adversely 
affect long-term growth so that aid inflows become counter-productive?  
This paper is a brief survey of the theories and the evidence related to the likelihood of 
aid-induced macroeconomic instability. In particular, the questions that it tries to 
address are: 
i)  To what extent can the utilization of foreign assistance to combat HIV/AIDS 
cause macroeconomic instability to the detriment of long-term growth? 
ii)  If there is a possibility of such instability, are there adequate policy 
instruments to mitigate it? 
iii)  How to track macroeconomically whether countries receiving foreign 
assistance are spending and absorbing it? 
iv)  What should be the overall macroeconomic policy framework to achieve 
HIV/AIDS objectives without causing macroeconomic instability? 
In answering these questions, one should bear in mind that foreign aid is a transfer of 
resources to the recipient countries. In the standard foreign aid model, this transfer 
implies a widening of the trade gap, which could be accompanied by a real appreciation 
of the domestic currency. That is, foreign aid helps finance a larger trade gap caused by 
increased import demands, which are prompted by increased economic activity arising 
from aid-funded expenditures. Hence, some real appreciation is likely to be a by-
product of the absorption of foreign aid. The real appreciation becomes problematic if it 
hinders export growth; that is, the trade gap widens also because of a significant 
reduction in exports. The key to prevent this syndrome from occurring is to offset the 
impact of real appreciation on international competitiveness by productivity-enhancing 
public policies. In the short run, the government can also respond to this problem with 
such policies as export subsidies and exchange rate controls.  
One condition under which foreign aid can be absorbed without the likelihood of real 
appreciation is commodity aid, wherein resources are transferred directly, or the entire 
                                                 
3   See Heller (2005) and Lewis (2005) for brief reviews of issues.   4
aid amount is used to buy non-competitive imports,4 without bringing the foreign 
currency into the recipient country.5 This is important to note since a large share of 
HIV/AIDS related foreign funding is likely to be used to buy essential drugs abroad, 
which will be transferred directly to HIV/AIDS affected countries. This is unlikely to 
have a significant adverse effect on the real exchange rate. 
The rest of this paper elaborates on these points, and is organized as follows: section 2 
describes the rationale for foreign aid inflows and the nature of transfer mechanisms 
under fixed and flexible exchange rate systems. Section 3 provides a survey of the 
theoretical possibilities and empirical evidence for aid induced ‘Dutch disease’;   
section 4 uses the analytical framework developed recently within the International 
Monetary Fund to examine policy options for aid receiving countries. Section 5 draws 
policy implications for HIV/AIDS related aid inflows and section 6 contains concluding 
remarks. 
2  The rationale for foreign aid 
As is well-known, the theoretical rationale for foreign aid (FA) is to fill the savings-
investment and/or foreign exchange gaps: developing countries have a deficient level of 
domestic savings to finance the level of investment necessary to achieve their desired 
rates of economic growth, and/or a lack of foreign exchange reserves to acquire 
imported capital goods.6 The role of FA within this traditional ‘two-gap’ model can be 
shown by using the national income identity. 
The national income or gross domestic product (Y) is equal to gross national 
expenditures, or the sum of consumption (C), government expenditure (G), investment 
(I) and net exports (X – M) ex post. That is, 
Y = C + I + G + X – M  (1) 
GDP is also equal to the sum of consumption (C), savings (S) and taxes (T), so that 
Y = C + S + T  (2) 
From (1) and (2), we get 
                                                 
4   Goods and services that are not domestically produced or goods and services that would have been 
imported even in the absence of foreign aid. 
5   Technical assistance is another form of ODA that is not likely to cause real appreciation if the money 
is used mainly for foreign consultants, who spend most of it in their home countries (which has, 
admittedly, its own drawbacks). 
6   The gaps produced by the savings or exports required for the planned investment or importation of 
capital goods to achieve a target growth rate are: 
  i)  savings–investment gap = s*Y – sY, where s* is the target savings rate and s is the actual savings 
rate; 
ii)  foreign exchange gap = m*Y – mY, where m* is the target import rate and m is the actual import 
rate, permitted by export earnings. In the pre-take-off stage, a developing country would have a 
dominant savings–investment gap, followed by a dominant foreign exchange gap. See Chenery 
and Bruno (1962), Chenery and Strout (1966) and Thirlwall (2003).   5
S + T = I + G + X – M  
Or,  I – [S + (T – G)] = M – X = F – J   (3) 
where T – G = government savings (fiscal surplus or deficit). 
F – J = the difference between net capital inflows (F) and net factor payments abroad 
(J).7 
Equation (3) states that ex post the gap between investment (I) and total domestic 
savings (S + T – G) must be equal to the imports-exports gap. That is, if there is any 
shortfall in domestic savings (compared to investment), this must be met by net foreign 
savings (F – J) flowing into the country. Most low-income countries receive foreign aid 
(FA) as their main form of foreign savings.8  
There is no reason for the two gaps to equal ex ante. Chenery and his associates argue 
that aid is more effective where the trade gap (M – X) or the foreign exchange gap  
(F – J) is larger ex ante. A binding or dominant trade gap (or foreign exchange gap) 
means that the country is unable to utilize its entire savings. That is, due to a shortage of 
critical imports, it cannot increase investment even when domestic savings are 
available. The country suffers from deficient demand (i.e., investment <savings) and has 
Keynesian type unemployment or underemployment. 
Bacha (1990) extends the 2-gap model into a 3-gap model, wherein the fiscal gap (T-G) 
constrains private sector investment at a level below what available national savings 
would permit.  
This derives from an assumed relationship between private investment (IP) and public 
investment (IG) as follows:  
IP = kIG   (4) 
Where k > 0 
Equation (4) recognizes that in developing countries, government investment in social 
and economic infrastructure sets an upper limit for profitable private investment.9 The 
low level (or lack of) of fiscal surplus (T – G) in the recurrent budget (referred to as the 
                                                 
7  From the balance of payments, the excess of imports over exports is equal to foreign transfers. 
Equation (3) assumes that the accumulation of foreign reserves is netted out of the capital account of 
the balance of payments to obtain the net value of capital inflows. For most low-income countries, 
there should be positive net capital inflows but, unfortunately, this is not always the case. Their net 
factor payments abroad are usually positive since they are making payment on inward foreign 
investment and have little outward investment of their own. 
8   Most developing countries receive minuscule amounts of private capital. Some, however, have 
substantial amount of remittance income.  
9   Equation (4) implies that public investment ‘crowds-in’ private investment. The crowding-in 
hypothesis is rooted in Gerschenkron’s analysis of European history and has empirical support in the 
successful economies of East Asia, Brazil and Mexico. Based on econometric analysis of 72 countries, 
Barro (1989: 29) concludes, ‘an extra unit of public investment induces about a one-for-one increase 
in private investment’ (emphasis original).   6
primary surplus) limits public investment (IG) and, according to equation (4), therefore 
limits private investment (IP).  
The government can finance its deficit by borrowing from the central bank. Government 
borrowing from the private sector is limited since the domestic capital market is very 
thin in most developing countries. Borrowing from the central bank (printing money) 
yields seigniorage (an inflation tax), through which unutilized private savings can be 
transferred to the government for public investment, which can, in turn, stimulate 
private investment.10 However, this method of financing public investment has its own 
limits because excessive inflation may become debilitating for private investment.   
In such circumstances, according to the 3-gap model, foreign aid can relax the financing 
constraint by supporting the budget. From the development or planning (ex ante) 
perspective, the government of a developing country can estimate the fiscal gap, and 
place the foreign exchange needs to the donors, who can then fill the gap.11 In other 
words, FA shifts the government budget constraint outward and allows the government 
to spend more to meet its development needs without having to resort to inflationary 
financing. See an illustration of this effect in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 










                                                 
10  This process is known as ‘forced savings’; see Kalecki (1976). 
11   There is considerable debate about whether a fiscal deficit causes FA (demand-driven FA) or FA 
causes a fiscal deficit (supply-driven FA). Most critics believe that aid is supply driven. For example, 
according to Easterly (2003), Judith Tendler’s observation dating back to 1975 that: ‘a donor 
organization’s sense of mission … relates not necessarily to economic development but to the 
commitment of resources, the moving of money’ remains valid even today. That is, donors are judged 
by the amount of money spent; hence, they are driven by the desire to ‘move money’. 
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   7
The horizontal axis of Figure 2 represents social goods, such as education, health and 
other programmes that directly enhance human development. The vertical axis 
represents government expenditures, such as on the military, the civil service and other 
activities that do not directly contribute to human development. Figure 2 shows that 
when the government’s budget constraint shifts from AA to BB, it can achieve higher 
welfare. However, donors and development practitioners have raised concerns about the 
fungibility of aid, in particular the use of aid to expand unproductive activities of the 
public sector (included in ‘other goods’ in Figure 2). If donors want to restrict the use of 
aid to social goods (e.g., water, health and education), the budget constraint will shift 
with a kink at B* (i.e., AB*B will be the new budget constraint).  
Development practitioners have also pointed out the possibility of lax revenue efforts by 
a government as a result of large FA inflows. In that case, the government budget 
constraint will shift to a position somewhere between AA and BB. (In the extreme case 
of a full offset, the budget constraint will remain at AA). Because of additional 
problems related to poor governance and the possibility of corruption, donors are now 
increasingly using aid conditionality to obligate governments to undertake tax reform 
and other public-sector reforms in order to overcome these problems.  
The effectiveness and welfare implications of such aid conditionality remain debatable. 
(See McGillivray [2000] for a survey of issues surrounding aid fungibility and fiscal 
behaviour and Easterly [2003] for a critical appraisal of the effectiveness of aid 
conditionality and aid selectivity.)  
2.1  The mechanism of resource transfer  
Since foreign aid (FA) is mainly a source of capital inflows, it should have 
macroeconomic effects similar to those of other forms of capital. However, since FA 
comes largely through public channels, the government can influence its effects by 
carefully choosing its expenditures.12 
As highlighted earlier, the transfer of resources due to foreign aid is often associated 
with real appreciation of the domestic currency. However, the mechanism through 
which real appreciation occurs depends on the exchange rate regime of the recipient 
country. To illustrate this process, we begin by examining the monetary balance sheet of 
an open economy, as presented in Table 1. 
Items in the foreign sector are recorded in the capital account of the balance of 
payments. For most developing countries, liabilities to the foreign sector (capital 
inflows) are larger than their assets (outflows). Hence, their capital account shows a 
surplus, which is matched by the current account deficit, and adjustments in the central 
bank’s net foreign reserves under a fixed exchange rate system, or the entire banking 
sector’s foreign currency holdings under a flexible exchange rate system. That is, 
inflows of capital must finance the current account deficit and the addition to foreign 
reserves.  
                                                 
12  A small portion of FA is channelled through non-governmental organizations. Some donor agencies, 
e.g., USAID, spend aid money directly on projects and their aid does not support the government 
budget.   8
Table 1 
Monetary balance sheet for a developing open economy 
Account Assets  Liabilities 
    
GOVERNMENT  Deposits with central & commercial 
banks (GD + BD) 
Outstanding debts 
 
    
CENTRAL BANK  1)  Net foreign reserve (NFR) 
2)  Credit to government (CRG) 
1) Currency  (C) 
2)  Reserves for deposits (R) 
3)  Government deposits (GD) 
    
COMMERCIAL BANKS 
 
1)  Reserves for deposits (R) 
2)  Lending to private sector (CRP) 
3)  Lending to government (BRG) 
1) Deposits  (D) 
  - Private (PD) 
   - Public (BD) 
 
    
PRIVATE SECTOR 
 
1) Currency  (C) 
2) Deposits  (D) 
3)  Lending to government (PRG) 
1)  Loans from commercial banks (CRP) 
    
FOREIGN SECTOR  1)  Lending overseas 
2)  Deposits in foreign banks 
3)  Outward foreign direct investment
1)  Foreign aid (FA) (loans) 
2)  Commercial lending to the 
government/public sector 
3)  Commercial lending to the private 
sector/banks 
4) Foreign  direct  investment 
    
On the domestic side, each account (except that of the government) is balanced, with 
assets equalling liabilities.13 Outstanding government debts (liabilities) imply that the 
government has been running budget deficits. The government has been financing these 
by a combination of borrowing from the central bank (CRG), from the commercial 
banks (BRG) and from the non-bank private sector (PRG). In an open economy, the 
government can also borrow from overseas (or receive grants). Each source of 
borrowing has different implications for the money supply (MS). The domestic capital 
markets in most developing countries are not developed enough to allow large-scale 
government borrowing from the non-bank private sector; also, governments do not have 
easy access to the international capital market. Thus, they have to resort to borrowing 
from the banking sector, mostly from the central bank, and attempt to fill the remaining 
gap with FA. How does this affect a country’s money supply? This can be explained as 
follows: 
Money supply (MS) is defined as: 
MS = C + D  (4) 
                                                 
13  Strictly speaking, none of the accounts will necessarily balance because of the value of physical assets 
and the resultant net worth, which are ignored here. However, physical assets are likely to be 
particularly important for the government and the private sector. Moreover, their inclusion draws 
attention to the links between the monetary and real sectors of the economy.    9
Central bank’s monetary liabilities (B) are: 
B = C + R + GD   (5) 
Dividing equation (4) by equation (5), we obtain: 
MS/B = (C + D)/ (C + R + GD)  (6) 
That is,   
MS = [(C + D)/ (C + R + GD)] B  (7) 
Dividing both denominator and numerator of the right hand side of equation (7) by D, 
we obtain: 
MS = [(c + 1)/ (c + q + g)] B 
Or  MS = m B   (8) 
Where c = C/D, the currency-deposit ratio 
  q = R/D, the reserve-deposit ratio 
  g = GD/D, the ratio of government deposits with the central bank to deposits 
  m = (c + 1)/ (c + q + g), the money multiplier 
Since the central bank’s monetary liabilities must equal its monetary assets (H = NFR + 
CRG), equation (8) can be expressed in terms of the central bank’s monetary assets (H) 
as: 
MS = m H  (8a) 
Equation (8) implies that the money supply is linked to the central bank’s liabilities 
through the money multiplier (m). Because the central bank’s total monetary liability is 
the source of the money supply (according to equation 8), it is called base money or 
high-powered money. 
In the standard textbook version, the money multiplier (m) is assumed constant, at least 
in the short run. Thus, the link between B (or H) and MS is assumed to be a rigid one. 
For example, an increase in the net foreign reserves (NFR) of the central bank, due to an 
increase in net aid inflows, should lead to an increase in the money supply by means of 
the money multiplier (m). However, whether an increase in foreign aid leads to an 
increase in the central bank’s net foreign reserves, and hence a multiple increase in the 
money supply, depends on the exchange rate regime of the country. 
2.2  A fixed exchange rate regime 
Spending foreign aid domestically requires exchanging aid denominated in foreign 
currency into local currency. In order to spend aid, the government sells the foreign 
currency to the central bank at the fixed exchange rate, so the foreign exchange holdings 
(NFR) of the central bank go up.   10
This increase in the central bank’s assets is balanced by an increase in its liabilities 
when the central bank issues equivalent domestic currency to the government for 
domestic spending. That is, there is an immediate increase in the supply of money 
equivalent to the local currency value of disbursed foreign aid. There will be further 
increases in the money supply through the private sector’s portfolio choice of currency 
or deposits and through domestic credit creation when banks receive deposits as a result 
of the government’s aid-induced expenditures. Thus, money supply goes up by a 
multiple of the initial increase in base money, depending on the size of c, q and g 
(defined above), which in turn depend on the behaviour of both the banking and the 
non-banking private sectors. 
The increased money supply is likely to lead to some degree of inflation. Thus, an 
increased inflow of FA might lead to the real appreciation of the domestic currency 
through a relative price effect. Since the nominal exchange rate is fixed, this can harm 
the competitiveness of a country’s exports. The central bank can offset (sterilize) the aid 
induced increase in its assets (NFR) in various ways. First, it can sell government bonds 
(CRG) to the non-bank private sector. Second, it can raise the reserve requirement for 
commercial bank deposits and thereby reduce their ability to create credit. Third, it can 
ask the government to shift its deposits from commercial banks to the central bank. 
This, too, will reduce commercial banks’ ability to extend credit. 
Often the preferred option is for the central bank to sell the foreign exchange, which it 
received from the government, to the private sector in order to mop up the initial 
injection of liquidity. This facilitates payments for increased imports induced by the 
increase in economic activity, caused, in turn, by aid-financed government expenditures 
(through the multiplier effect). This is how the central bank can facilitate the absorption 
of foreign aid.14 
2.3  A flexible exchange rate regime 
Under a flexible exchange rate system, the central bank does not intervene in the foreign 
exchange market, and therefore FA inflows should not affect the money supply. In a 
flexible exchange rate system, the government sells the foreign currency in the open 
market (i.e., exchanges the aid denominated in foreign currency) for local currency. The 
increase in the supply of foreign currency reduces its price relative to the local currency. 
In other words, the local currency strengthens vis-à-vis the foreign currency.15 Thus, in 
a flexible exchange rate system, real appreciation of the local currency happens via 
nominal appreciation. 
In reality, the government does not sell the entire amount of foreign currency in the 
open market, but deposits some foreign exchange either at the central bank or at 
commercial banks. When it is deposited at the central bank, NFR initially increases, but 
                                                 
14 Absorption, here, is used differently from the traditional usage of the term, such as in ‘absorptive 
capacity’, which is related to microeconomic issues such as the availability of counter funds, project 
readiness, project management, and institutional factors such as governance. 
15 The exchange rate (e) is defined as the price of one unit of foreign currency in terms of the local 
currency (e.g., 1 USD = Rs 60). Therefore, when the exchange rate (e) falls, it means the appreciation 
of the local currency.   11
this is offset by the decrease in government debt to the central bank, leaving the total 
money base unchanged. But as soon as the government draws on its deposits to finance 
expenditure, net domestic assets and base money increase. 
When the government deposits the aid-supplied foreign currency at commercial banks 
rather than at the central bank, FA inflows do not automatically increase base money. 
But this option increases commercial banks’ ability to create credit. As commercial 
banks sell foreign currencies in the market in response to increased import demand 
induced by increased economic activity, there will be a nominal and real appreciation of 
the domestic currency. In other words, the resultant demand for domestic currency will 
drive up its relative price. 
Thus, regardless of the exchange rate regime, there is a possibility that large foreign aid 
inflows can cause real appreciation of the domestic currency. As noted earlier, this 
should be regarded, in fact, as a predictable effect of the transfer of real resources to 
developing countries. The real appreciation accompanies the widening of the trade gap, 
which is financed by the increase in aid flows. The assumption here is that the trade gap 
widens mainly due to increased imports. That is, the counterpart of increased aid 
inflows is the additional imports of goods and services. 
However, a real appreciation that is too large might adversely affect the tradable 
sector—a condition referred to as the ‘Dutch disease’.16 This implies, paradoxically, 
that foreign aid could be harmful in the long run if it leads to shrinkage of the tradable 
sector. In other words, real appreciation leads to a reduction in exports (as well as an 
increase in imports). If that happens, then there would be an ever-widening trade gap 
that needs continuous aid financing. The following section reviews the theory and 
evidence on the Dutch disease phenomenon. 
3  Dutch disease—the theory 
The first formal treatment of real exchange rate misalignment due to large FA inflows 
that cause stagnating exports and deteriorating external balance (a Dutch disease like 
syndrome) is by van Wijnbergen (1986). Van Wijnbergen disaggregates the economy 
into tradable (T) and non-tradable (NT) sectors and examines the impact of foreign aid 
on the relative prices of the two (PT/PN).17  
In the two-sector, traded/non-traded model, it is assumed that PN is determined by 
domestic demand and PT is determined in the world market (hence it is exogenous for a 
small open economy). When FA is spent domestically, according to van Wijnbergen, a 
large portion falls on the NT sector since government services and infrastructures are 
largely non-tradable. This causes a rise in PN and hence a real appreciation (PT/PN 
falls). As a result, resources shift from tradables to non-tradables, and the tradable-
                                                 
16 The term Dutch disease was used to describe the adverse impact of the discovery of natural gas on the 
Dutch manufacturing sector. A sudden surge in export earnings from natural resources caused a real 
appreciation of the local currency that put manufacturing exports at a disadvantage. 
17 The relative price (PT/PN) between the traded and non-traded sectors can also be regarded as the real 
exchange rate (if the nominal exchange rate is fixed). PT is a proxy for the world price (in local 
currency) while PN represents the domestic price level.    12
sector shrinks. To the extent that part of the spending induced by foreign aid is directed 
at the tradable-sector, the availability of exportables declines. Furthermore, the 
increased expenditure due to the multiplier effect of the initial government expenditure 
causes imports to rise. The net effect of a decline in exportables and a rise in imports is 
a deterioration of the external balance. This adverse effect is exacerbated if the export 
sector is characterized by ‘learning-by-doing’ (LBD) externalities, and hence has higher 
productivity than the NT sector. It is assumed that the shrinking of the export sector 
leads to falling productivity in the whole economy. 
In the words of van Wijnbergen (1986: 130), ‘This point may be worth stressing: 
substantial amounts of aid will put upward pressure on the real exchange rate and will 
in that way counteract the export promotion schemes often recommended by the aid 
donors’ (original emphasis). In such a circumstance, according to van Wijnbergen, the 
export sector (especially if it is characterized by LBD infant industries) should be 
supported with increased production subsidies. 
3.1  The optimum aid level and the Laffer curve analogy 
The Dutch disease model implies that there is an optimal level of aid beyond which the 
effectiveness of aid declines. A sudden surge in FA flows may even reduce real income 
and create a vicious circle of aid leading to greater aid dependence. Such a problem 
could also arise from the lack of aid absorption capacity, public mismanagement or poor 
governance. 
Researchers who have empirically examined the hypothesis of diminishing returns to 
aid have customarily used an aid-squared term in their models. The coefficient of this 
term has been consistently negative and significant—validating the hypothesis of 
diminishing returns. However, the threshold level for the diminishing returns to set in 
varies considerably, ranging from 15 per cent to 45 per cent of GDP. 
Gomanee, Girma and Morrissey (2003) are critical of the earlier aid threshold (or Laffer 
curve based) empirical studies. They point out that these studies imposed a particular 
form of non-linearity, specifically a relationship between aid and growth that has an 
inverted U-shape—first positive and then negative. This also implies that there is only 
one threshold. Instead, they argue, there could be more than one turning point. Thus, 
Gomanee, Girma and Morrissey use a technique that allows data to determine the 
number of thresholds (i.e., there is no prior imposition of the type of non-linearity). 
Since the technique is based on asymptotic theory, it is possible to test the statistical 
significance of the estimates. To quote these authors, ‘results show that there is a 
threshold beyond which aid becomes effective, but no evidence of a second threshold in 
aid beyond which aid becomes less effective’ (Gomanee, Girma and Morrissey 2003: 
16). That is, while too little aid is ineffective (and can even be costly in terms of the 
need for expenditures on managing it, for example), there is no evidence that too much 
aid is harmful. 
In contrast, some researchers maintain that there is a ‘transfer paradox’, namely, that an 
increase in aid will lead to less growth and development. Box 1 discusses one such 
model. 
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Box 1 
Discussions of the aid ‘transfer paradox’  
 
Yano and Nugent (1999) introduce an interesting twist to the Dutch disease debate. In their model of 
2-factors and 3-goods (exports, imports and non-tradables—NT) including an import tax (tariff), foreign aid 
(FA) inflows can paradoxically reduce the overall welfare of the recipient country. However, in contrast to 
the Dutch disease model, the immiserizing effect of FA happens, in the Yano-Nugent model, due to a 
decline in the price of NT. While in the Dutch disease model, excess demand for NT goods causes the 
relative price of NT—PN—to rise (implying sluggish or inelastic supply of NT), in the Yano-Nugent model, 
aid-funded projects cause an expansion of NT goods (infrastructure, education, health), and hence a 
supply-induced reduction in PN. This result, however, depends on the presence of import tariffs since they 
allow the expansion of the import-competing sector and the corresponding contraction of the export sector. 
Import barriers or tariffs make the import-competing sector essentially non-tradable. Thus, the Yano-
Nugent model shows that if aid finances excessive expansion of import-substituting activities (protected by 
tariffs), the real income of a small country might decline. Note that this result depends on an excessive 
expansion of the NT sector. No transfer paradox arises when the NT sector expands to keep the demand-
supply balance at the existing price level.  
Choi (2004), in a theoretical model also involving 2-factors and 3-goods, shows that the possibility of a 
reduction in PN is remote. According to Choi (2004: 250), ‘As long as the entire amount of foreign aid is 
not used for capital formation in the import-competing sector, or some development aid is used in the 
export sector, the transfer paradox cannot occur’ (original emphasis). In their own empirical work, Yano 
and Nugent (1999) themselves do not find much evidence to support their theoretical arguments. Only in 
four countries out of 44 in their sample did they find some evidence of a transfer paradox.  
In support of his argument against the Yano-Nugent transfer paradox, Choi cites the example of the 
Marshall Plan after the Second World War—one of the most historically successful aid programmes. 
Between 1948 and 1952, 15 European countries received more than US$13 billion from the US under this 
plan (equivalent to US$100 billion in 2005). The majority of these countries were small, and the aid money 
went to rebuild both non-tradable and tradable sectors. Within the non-tradable sector, aid money went to 
both export and import competing activities. Interestingly, none of these countries is known to have 
suffered from a transfer paradox.  
 
3.2  Limitations of the Dutch disease model 
The logic of the Dutch disease model is not compelling. First, the original Dutch disease 
model does not consider the possibility of using sterilizing monetary policy in response 
to an excessive over-valuation of domestic currency. As noted earlier, the central bank 
can sterilize the monetary impact of FA in a number of ways, such as selling its 
holdings of government bonds, raising the reserve requirements for commercial banks 
or transferring government deposits from commercial banks to the central bank. One 
could object by pointing to the supposedly limited scope for sterilization because of the 
underdeveloped nature of capital markets in low-income countries. However, according 
to a recent study at the IMF (Prati, Sahay and Tressel 2005), the practice of sterilization 
is widespread among aid-receiving countries. Over the period 1960-98, the study found 
704 episodes—out of 1,935 episodes of foreign aid inflows that were greater than two 
per cent of GDP—during which net domestic monetary assets of the central bank fell. 
The study also reports on the more recent experiences of Ghana, Ethiopia, Mozambique, 
Tanzania and Uganda that also have reduced net domestic monetary assets in response 
to surges in aid flows.  
The central bank can also neutralize the impact of increased inflows of FA by reducing 
the size of the money multiplier (m) through (i) influencing reserves (R) and/or   
(ii) influencing private sector behaviour with regard to currency holdings and deposits   14
(C/D). For example, by lowering the interest rate, the central bank could encourage 
commercial banks to keep excess reserves and individuals to hold more cash and fewer 
deposits. This outcome will simultaneously increase the reserve-deposit ratio (q) and the 
currency-deposit ratio (c), which, in turn, will reduce the size of the money multiplier. 
The government can also influence the money multiplier by shifting its deposits from 
the central bank to commercial banks or vice-versa to influence g (i.e., GD/D).  
Thus, the central bank and the government can minimize the harmful effects of 
increased aid flows on the money supply, and hence on inflation and the real exchange 
rate. However, as will be explained later, a full sterilization that leaves the real 
exchange rate unchanged is not desirable. The central banks of the aid recipient 
countries have to accept some real appreciation in order to carry out a transfer of real 
resources. Sterilization policy should be pursued only when there are signs of excessive 
over-valuation of the domestic currency. 
The government can choose to keep FA in an overseas account—instead of depositing it 
in the central bank—in order to use it directly to finance imports. Under this 
arrangement, private importers buy foreign currencies from the government, which then 
settles the transactions on behalf of the importers from its overseas account. If the 
private importers borrow from their banks to pay the government, the banks simply 
credit that to the government accounts that they hold. This leaves the banks’ balance 
sheets unchanged. Hence, there will be no impact on the domestic money supply.  
Thus, this arrangement is similar to the direct transfer of resources via commodity aid, 
which can be absorbed without real appreciation. However, the government has to 
ensure that the aid money is used to import non-competitive imports. That is, 
aid-financed imports must not substitute for goods and services that would otherwise 
have been imported or produced locally. This will ensure that real resources are 
transferred without real appreciation. 
An added advantage of this arrangement is that the government can effectively follow a 
managed float exchange rate system in order to avoid excessive real appreciation of the 
domestic currency. That is, it can choose at what nominal exchange rate it wants to sell 
foreign currencies to private importers, keeping an eye on the movement of the real 
exchange rate.  
One of the glaring omissions of the Dutch disease model is a lack of recognition of the 
supply-side effect of increased FA. It implicitly assumes that the supply in the NT 
sector is sluggish so that the price of NT is driven up in response to increased demand. 
The model also assumes, in effect, that the economy is characterized by full 
employment, which would require resources to be transferred from the tradable sector to 
the non-tradable sector. It is not possible in this model for both sectors to grow together. 
The model also ignores the productivity-enhancing role of infrastructure, education and 
health (which are part of the NT sector). It also assumes that ‘learning-by-doing’ (LBD) 
occurs only in the tradable sector. 
These assumptions are at odds with the experience of most developing countries, where 
a vast army of underemployed and unemployed do not find jobs even when they are 
ready to work at a lower real wage (see Nkusu 2004). A large number of empirical 
studies find a positive impact of public infrastructure, education and health on   15
productivity growth.18 Furthermore, there is no reason why LBD or other kinds of 
externalities cannot occur in the non-tradable sector.   
In addition to the impact of foreign aid on the supply of money, one needs to consider 
the impact on money demand. The inflationary impact of increased FA flows depends 
on a growth rate of money supply that exceeds the growth rate of real GDP. As the 
economy grows, so does the demand for money needed to facilitate the increased 
transactions. As noted by Little et al. (1993), the typical developing country has a 
rapidly growing demand for money, as the economy becomes more monetized and as 
households and firms increasingly hold assets in financial forms such as currency, 
demand deposits or time accounts. This means that the income elasticity of the demand 
for money is likely to be greater than unity in low-income countries. Therefore, if one 
allows for the growth enhancing effects of aid-financed public investment, then the 
economy can accommodate an increase in money supply without generating significant 
inflationary pressure. 
Thus, the alleged impact on inflation and real appreciation of increased FA, which 
would supposedly cause a Dutch disease, is not inevitable. It depends on how the 
monetary authority manages its assets and liabilities and uses interest rate policy, and on 
how the supply side responds to fiscal expansion. In a recent IMF Working Paper, 
Gupta, Powell and Yang (2005: 13), conclude: 
The macroeconomic impact of aid is likely to depend on how the aid is used. If 
aid is used to boost supply capacity, its macroeconomic consequences are 
likely to be mitigated… Once appropriate consideration is taken of the supply-
side impact of aid flows, there is no clear presumption as to whether, over the 
medium term, there will be a real exchange rate appreciation or depreciation 
or whether the tradable sector will contract or expand. This is essentially an 
empirical issue, on which individual country circumstances are likely to differ 
(original emphasis).  
3.3  Evidence of Dutch disease 
Unfortunately, ‘there are remarkably few empirical studies of Dutch disease in aid-
receiving countries’ (Prati, Sahay and Tressel 2005: 32). Figures 3A and 3B present 
scatter plots of average net aid/GDP ratios vis-à-vis inflation and real exchange rates of 
42 aid dependent countries for the period 1970-2003. The range of net aid dependence 
varies from 4 per cent to 49 per cent of GDP.19 To calculate the real exchange rate, we 
have used the nominal US-dollar exchange rate of domestic currency and taken the US 
consumer price index as a proxy for foreign prices. Thus, the real exchange rate is 
defined as RER= eUS CPI/domestic CPI, where e is the local currency value of one 
 
                                                 
18    See Adam and Bevan (2004), Calderon and Serven (2003), Gupta et al. (2004), Barro and   
Sala-I-Martin (1995) and Krueger and Lindahl (2004). 
19    One can use alternative measures of aid dependence, such as aid/government revenue or 
aid/government expenditure. Net aid is a capital flow concept and is net of principal payments. 
However, a better indicator is the net aid transfers (NAT), which is net of both principal and interest, 
and excludes debt cancellations. Recently the Center for Global Development has produced a dataset 
of NAT. See www.cgdev.org/doc/data%20sets/roodman05/NAT.xls.   16
Figure 3A 
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Figure 3B 
Aid/GDP ratios, inflation and real exchange rates (average 1970-2003) 
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Source: IDS (OECD) and IFS (IMF) online databases.   17
US dollar, so that a rise in the real exchange rate indicates a real depreciation of the 
domestic currency. 
Contrary to the Dutch disease hypothesis, the relationship between inflation and net aid 
is clearly negative, even without outliers (i.e., inflation rates >30 per cent and net 
aid/GDP >30 per cent). Although the relationship between net aid and real exchange 
rates is negative, implying that a rise in net aid inflows leads to real appreciation, when 
outliers (real exchange rates >700 and net aid/GDP >30 per cent) are omitted, it 
becomes mildly positive. That is, in the absence of exceptionally high inflows of net 
aid, the real exchange rate is likely to depreciate. In sum, the cross-country evidence on 
the Dutch disease is, at best, mixed with any evidence in its favour heavily influenced 
by outliers.  
Table 2 presents correlation coefficients of net aid/GDP ratios with inflation rates and 
real exchange rates for 13 African countries, including nine countries that recently 
experienced a surge in HIV/AIDS related aid inflows. In eight countries, the association 
between net aid inflows and real exchange rates is positive, implying a real 
depreciation. In the remaining five countries there is weak evidence of real appreciation. 
The correlation between net aid inflows and inflation rates is in most cases found to be 
positive (in contrast to the results for the larger sample just mentioned). Hence, because 
of the mixed evidence, it is not possible to say a priori whether a rise in net aid inflows 
would lead to real appreciation or higher inflation. As will be shown later, the 
macroeconomic impact of aid inflows depends on the way the government and the 
central bank respond with public investment, credit allocation and reserve management 
policies. 
Table 2 
Correlation coefficients of net aid/GDP ratio with inflation and real exchange rates 
in highly aid dependent African countries 
Countries  Real exchange rate  Inflation 
    
Ghana (1970-97)  0.79  -0.32 
Chad   (1983-2002)  -0.48  -0.07 
Burundi   (1970-2003)  0.76  0.13 
Rwanda   (1970-2003)  0.13  -0.01 
Uganda   (1980-2003)  0.69  -0.51 
Ethiopia   (1970-2002)  0.36  -0.13 
Kenya   (1970-2003)  0.45  0.68 
Lesotho   (1973-2003)  -0.30  0.28 
Malawi   (1980-2003)  0.42  0.39 
Mozambique   (1986-2003)  -0.09  0.66 
Swaziland   (1970-2003)  -0.48  0.55 
Tanzania   (1970-2003)  0.72  0.45 
Zambia   (1970-2003)  -0.08  -0.05 
Notes:    The real exchange rate is estimated as ((nominal exchange rate * US CPI)/domestic prices). 
  The US CPI is a proxy for foreign prices in each country.  
  The nominal exchange rate is expressed as the price of one US$ in domestic currency.  
  So, a rise in the real exchange rate means a real depreciation. 
Sources:  IDS (OECD) and IFS (IMF) online databases.   18
Our evidence cited above is roughly in line with the observation of Lewis (2005: 9), ‘the 
available evidence on the macroeconomic effects of large aid flows is somewhat 
ambiguous. The evidence base is modest, and country circumstances appear to play a 
major role in determining the impacts’. 
The recent IMF survey of empirical findings on Dutch disease in Africa, by Gupta, 
Powell and Yang (2005) concurs. Following are their findings: 
this evidence is not overwhelmingly significant. Econometric estimates often 
show the impact of aid on the exchange rate to be small and statistically 
insignificant. … Time series models tend to reveal that the real exchange rate 
responds less to aid variations than to other exogenous factors, such as terms of 
trade variations. Moreover, some studies of African countries find that aid 
inflows appear to be associated with a real depreciation, reflecting increased 
productivity (supply-side response) as a result of aid (ibid. 14). 
To the extent that higher aid flows alleviate supply bottlenecks, they can offset 
the effect of an exchange rate appreciation on export growth (ibid. 15, original 
emphasis).  
When aid flows build up public infrastructure and thus augment the 
productivity of private factors, it is possible to realize significant medium-term 
welfare gains from aid, even in the presence of some short-term Dutch disease 
(ibid. 16, original emphasis). 
In sum, the theoretical literature on Dutch disease ignores the important condition that 
foreign aid is channelled mainly through the government of the recipient country, in 
support of its budgetary position. In many developing countries, investment needs are 
high, but private savings are low. Hence, governments are forced to run deficits because 
their revenue base is narrow and their tax administration weak. However, low private 
savings limit governments’ ability to borrow domestically. At the same time, 
developing countries cannot borrow internationally at reasonable interest rates due to 
their poor credit ratings.  
Thus, foreign aid remains the only source of deficit financing available to maintain 
public investment high enough to generate the economic growth necessary for poverty 
reduction. For example, during Indonesia’s early phase of transformation, aid inflows 
financed 80-90 per cent of development expenditures. In the absence of foreign aid, the 
governments of developing countries would have no other option but to borrow from 
their central banks (namely, print money) to finance their investment needs.20 In other 
words, foreign aid allows the recipient government to pursue an expansionary fiscal 
policy without causing significant inflationary pressures through monetary expansion. 
                                                 
20 A typical developing country finances approximately 50 per cent of budget deficits through the 
banking system (Little et al. 1993). Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1993: 221) estimate a seigniorage 
effect of about 2 per cent of GNP for a sample of 35 developing countries, as opposed to 1 per cent for 
a sample of 15 developed countries. Thus, in developing countries, monetary policy can serve as an 
instrument for fiscal authorities. Taylor (1979: 27) puts it succinctly: ‘The Bank has to “print” money 
by absorbing government obligations if the Finance Minister orders it to do so’. For more details on 
the link between budget deficits and money supply in developing countries, see Hossain and 
Chowdhury (1996).   19
Even when developing countries are able to raise domestic savings, they can find 
themselves in a quandary, wherein they cannot use the savings for investment due to 
shortages of critical imports because of a lack of foreign exchange. As a result, they 
suffer from Keynesian type unemployment (or underemployment) despite the fact that 
real wages in most cases are very low, and are often below the poverty line. The 
unemployment/underemployment problems in these countries cannot be attributed to 
the downward inflexibility of real wages. Further cuts in real wages would simply swell 
the pool of the working poor. In such circumstances, foreign aid facilitates imports that 
support the increased investment needed to create productive employment. 
4  A macroeconomic framework for analysing aid utilization 
Experience shows that the macroeconomic impact of aid depends critically on the policy 
response of the government. If the aid is used to expand the productive capacity of the 
economy or to remove critical supply bottlenecks, then there is likely to be little adverse 
impact associated with Dutch disease-like problems.  
The macroeconomic impact of aid also depends on central bank behaviour. For 
example, it could use the aid-induced increase in reserves to expand low-cost credit to 
the private sector so that the latter could take advantage of the government’s supply-
enhancing fiscal programmes. For instance, Indonesia used the increased flows of 
foreign exchange (whether due to oil booms or increased aid inflows) to expand 
low-cost credit schemes for rural and small-scale industries.21 Its experience also 
demonstrates that the central bank can successfully manage the exchange rate to offset 
any appreciating effect of reserve accumulation.22  
In short, the effectiveness of aid flows depends on a coordinated fiscal, monetary and 
exchange rate policy response of the government and the central bank.  
A recent IMF working paper (IMF 2005) provides a useful macroeconomic framework 
for analysing the use of foreign aid.23 It defines two aid-related concepts—absorption 
and spending. Absorption captures both direct and indirect increases in imports financed 
by aid, and shows how much in additional imports is possible due to the availability of 
aid. Similarly, spending refers to additional government spending that is aid-financed. 
In other words, these two terms capture the way that aid helps finance a widening 
foreign exchange (trade) gap and an increasing savings gap (specifically, a larger 
government deficit).  
Absorption and spending can be defined as: 
 Absorption  =  Δ(current account deficit without aid)/ΔAid 
                                                 
21  Before the crisis, Indonesian banks were required to lend 20 per cent of their loans to SMEs. The main 
financial institution for financing SMEs and the rural sector has been the Bank Rakyat Indonesia 
(BRI). 
22  See Chowdhury and Sugema (2005). 
23  For a summary and evaluation of the framework, see McKinley (2005).   20
 Spending  = Δ(budget deficit without aid)/ΔAid 
   where  Δ denotes change.  
‘Without aid’ signifies the size of the respective deficits before aid financing is taken 
into account. Thus, the current account deficit excludes official grants and interest on 
external public debt while the budget deficit equals total government expenditure minus 
domestic revenue when no aid is registered.24  
From the balance-of-payments side, an increase in aid can be utilized (absorbed) in 
some combination of (i) an increase in the rate of reserve accumulation, (ii) an increase 
in capital outflows (which may include foreign debt servicing) and (iii) an increase in 
the trade account deficit. However, not all of these options will allow effective 
absorption of aid. For example, option (ii) amounts to no real transfer of resources—
foreign exchange comes and goes without adding any new capacity to the economy. 
Similarly, if the central bank decides to use the entire additional aid flows to boost its 
reserves of foreign currencies, then none of the extra aid gets absorbed. The central 
bank can do this by shedding other components of its financial assets—in this case 
selling its holding of government bonds—so that the bank’s overall financial assets 
remain unchanged. However, the selling of government bonds pushes up the interest 
rate on government bonds and with it the overall interest rates. Thus, such a response is 
tantamount to following a restrictive monetary policy regime in response to increased 
aid flows.  
Therefore, for the effective absorption of additional aid, the central bank should 
respond with an expansionary policy stance and maintain a lower policy interest rate 
(equivalent to option (iii)) above). Since the lower interest rate should increase 
domestic demand, the trade deficit should widen. The central bank then uses its foreign 
exchange reserves to finance the increase in the trade gap.   
From the fiscal side (i.e., the savings-investment gap), an increase in aid can be utilized 
in some combination of (i) an increase in government expenditures, (ii) a reduction in 
tax revenue and (iii) a retiring of existing government debt. Option (ii) is not, however, 
a viable option. The rationale for providing aid is to allow the government to spend 
more than is possible with its own resources. The substitution of aid revenue for tax 
revenue leaves the government budget deficit unchanged. Hence, no new spending takes 
place. Moreover, when aid substitutes for domestic revenue, fiscal sustainability 
becomes vulnerable to aid volatility. Also, option (iii) is not desirable. If new aid money 
finances an activity (or is used to service debt), which was supposed to be financed from 
domestic sources, then overall government spending remains unchanged. 
Therefore, the government should not use an increase in aid flows to reduce its tax 
efforts; nor should it use the additional aid money to finance expenditures (or to service 
debts) that are supposed to be financed from domestic resources. Instead, the 
government should use the aid money for purposes such as increasing the economy’s 
productive capacity, removing bottlenecks in the economy or enhancing the public 
sector’s absorptive capacity. 
                                                 
24 In the absence of aid, current account and fiscal deficits could be financed by borrowing externally at 
market rates.   21
Table 3 
Correlation coefficients of net aid/GDP ratio with budget deficit, trade deficit and reserves 
in highly aid dependent African countries 
Countries  Budget deficit/GDP  Trade deficit/GDP  Reserves/GDP 
     
Ghana   (1970-97)  0.73 -0.71  0.69 
Chad   (1983-2002)  -0.23  –  0.35 
Burundi   (1970-2003)  -0.46  -0.77  0.42 
Rwanda   (1970-2003)  0.04  -0.81  0.07 
Uganda   (1980-2003)  -0.32  -0.54  0.27 
Ethiopia   (1970-2002) -0.28  -0.55  0.17 
Kenya   (1970-2003) -0.27  0.28  -0.59 
Lesotho   (1973-2003) -0.30  -0.84  -0.80 
Malawi   (1980-2003)  –  -0.41  -0.04 
Mozambique   (1986-2003)  –  -0.42  0.12 
Swaziland   (1970-2003)  -0.14  -0.17  0.23 
Tanzania   (1970-2003) 0.30  -0.84  -0.05 
Zambia   (1970-2003)  0.36  -0.17  -0.12 
Notes:   Since budget and trade deficits are negative numbers, a negative correlation implies a widening 
of deficits with increases in net aid/GDP. 
Sources:  IDS (OECD) and IFS (IMF) online databases. 
Table 3 presents the correlation coefficients of net aid/GDP ratios with budget balance 
and trade balance in highly aid dependent African countries that have in recent times 
experienced surges in aid flows. Ideally, the correlation coefficients of aid flows with 
budget and trade deficits should be close to one, and that with reserves should be close 
to zero. As can be seen from Table 3, in seven countries out of thirteen, the correlation 
coefficients between budget deficits and net aid flows are negative. Although the 
correlations are not very high, they imply larger budget deficits in the presence of aid. 
That is, in these countries, aid was at least partially spent. In the remaining six 
countries, aid substituted domestic sources of finance and hence there was narrowing of 
budget deficits in the presence of aid. On the other hand, in all countries (except 
Kenya), the correlations between net aid and trade deficit are negative, and larger than 
those with budget deficits. That is, in these countries a large part of aid was absorbed. 
This is likely due to the fact that they receive large commodity aid and technical 
assistance, which are direct resource transfers. Finally, except in Kenya, Malawi and 
Zambia, part of aid went to boost foreign exchange reserves. In sum, none of these 
countries, some of which experienced large HIV/AIDS related aid flows in recent times, 
responded optimally to aid flows. 
Similarly, the 2005 IMF study of five African countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, 
Tanzania and Uganda) finds that an optimal policy response did not occur in any of 
these countries. In Ethiopia and Ghana, both absorption and spending were very low. 
While Ethiopia accumulated reserves to bolster its exchange rate peg against the dollar, 
Ghana built a buffer of reserves against extremely volatile aid inflows. In the other three 
countries, spending exceeded absorption, indicating that there was a lack of 
coordination between fiscal and monetary policies. Foster and Killick (2006) also report 
similar findings. 
Ideally, an increased inflow of foreign aid should enable a country to adopt more 
expansionary fiscal policies. However, central bank must accommodate the absorption   22
of aid through its decision about the rate of reserve accumulation, as well as through its 
interest rate policy, which influences private spending decisions and hence the demand 
for imports. The central bank and the government should accept some real appreciation 
of the domestic currency, if necessary, in order to accommodate increased imports. 
However, the exchange rate still needs to be judiciously managed to prevent the 
possibility of excessive real appreciation. That is, in order to effectively utilize 
additional foreign aid without causing macroeconomic instability, there should be well 
coordinated expansionary fiscal and monetary policies coupled with a managed 
exchange rate policy. 
Why do central banks and governments deviate from an optimal policy response to 
increased aid flows? There are two primary reasons. First, they are concerned with the 
uncertainty of aid commitments and disbursements. They do not want to incur 
obligations with projects and expenditures that cannot be sustained if aid flows drop. 
Second, they fear inflation and real exchange rate appreciation. While the concerns with 
aid volatility are genuine, there is little basis for the inordinate fear of Dutch disease. A 
large body of empirical studies finds no adverse effect of moderate inflation (in the 
range of 10-15 per cent) on economic growth.25 Also, countries that increase 
government spending do not necessarily slip into unsustainable fiscal deficits; many 
countries (such as Malaysia, Republic of Korea and Thailand) prospered with a fiscal 
deficit of around 5-6 per cent of GDP for long periods and successfully used fiscal 
deficits to maintain domestic demand during declines in external demand.26  
Donors also have the responsibility of ensuring sufficient predictability in the flow of 
aid. At the same time, they must adopt a more flexible attitude towards inflation and 
budget deficits and work with recipient countries to ensure that resources are allocated 
within the framework of a long-term development strategy so that the threat of Dutch 
disease is less likely to arise. The challenge in a scaled-up aid environment is to ensure 
that increased availability of resources is used to increase productivity and enhance 
human wellbeing. 
Finally, both donors and recipient countries should have a clear exit strategy from 
reliance on aid. Recipient countries must use the breathing space and growth 
momentum due to increased aid flows to broaden their revenue base and strengthen 
their governance and absorptive capacity.  
5  Policy options with regard to HIV/AIDS related foreign aid  
As the preceding discussion has shown, the option of neither spending nor absorbing aid 
is not viable, especially when dealing with a daunting human development disaster such 
as the HIV/AIDS epidemic. This option defeats the purpose of scaling up aid, which is 
urgently needed for tackling HIV/AIDS head-on. Given the need for an emergency 
response and the scarcity of domestic resources, the ideal policy option would be to 
                                                 
25  For a survey see Chowdhury (2005). 
26   More importantly, fear should not dominate public policy decisions. It would be pertinent at this 
juncture to paraphrase Bob Hawke, the former Australian Prime Minister, that policymakers cannot be 
too scared to put a foot forward for fear of putting the wrong foot.   23
both ‘spend and absorb’ aid. That is, the recipients of GFATM and other aid related 
international assistance (such as PEPFAR) should adopt more expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policies in order to effectively support HIV/AIDS programmes. The 
possibility of excessive real appreciation due to such expansionary policies can be 
minimized by coordinating fiscal and monetary policies and carefully managing the 
exchange rate. Moreover, the effect of real appreciation on exports could be mitigated 
by export subsidies targeted to the tradable sector and linked to productivity-enhancing 
public investment. 
Hence, the general principle that should guide the use of HIV/AIDS related foreign aid 
is to adopt an expansionary fiscal and monetary policy stance, coupled with a managed 
exchange rate regime. Specifically, the funds from the international community for 
HIV/AIDS can be used: 
i)  to fund direct imports of drugs and equipment, which either are not 
domestically produced or would not have been imported anyway, and 
ii)  to finance effective national programmes of treatment, care and prevention. 
If aid funding is used to directly import equipment and medicines, it will be 
simultaneously spent and absorbed. Such measures should not have any monetary 
implication, since the central bank does not issue equivalent domestic currency to the 
government for increased spending. However, the government still needs to incur 
expenditures to enhance domestic capacity, such as for health clinics and trained 
healthcare personnel. In the absence of adequate capacity, the country cannot effectively 
use aid-funded equipment imports. In most cases, building capacity would require 
financing from the central bank, at least in the short- to medium-term when the revenue 
base is low. If the government borrows from the central bank to finance its ensuing 
deficit, this will inject liquidity into the economy. Hence, there will likely be some 
inflationary impact because of a lag in the response of supply to increased demand. 
When external funding comes as budget support, it should not replace existing 
government programmes financed from domestic sources or be used to reduce taxation. 
Nor should the government use foreign aid to retire its debt. Therefore, whether foreign 
assistance for HIV/AIDS programmes comes as a direct transfer of resources or as 
budget support, the recipient governments must be allowed to increase their spending. 
The increased aid-supported spending on HIV/AIDS programmes must not be matched 
by cuts in other social sectors, such as education, basic health and human security, 
especially since these sectors have important complementarities with HIV/AIDS 
prevention and control.  
Monetary policy needs to support the government’s expenditure programme. First, the 
central bank should not, as a general rule, sterilize the increase in its foreign exchange 
reserves (due to aid) by selling government bonds to the public. If it sterilizes, then the 
overall expenditure level in the economy will not rise—only the private-public mix of 
expenditures will change. Hence, aid does not get spent in a genuine sense. In contrast, 
the central bank could use its additional reserves, for example, to develop specialized 
low-cost credit programmes for HIV prone regions in order to stimulate employment 
and income generation, and thus increase the supply of factors of production.  
Second, the additional aid money should not be used to boost the central bank’s foreign 
exchange reserves. Instead, the central bank should sell foreign exchange to the private   24
sector in order to facilitate an increase in import demand due to the multiplier effects of 
government expenditure. After all, aid is meant to facilitate the financing of larger trade 
deficits. Additionally, while such a policy will facilitate the absorption of aid, it will 
partly neutralize the initial increase in liquidity and dampen any potential inflationary 
impact. 
Governments and central banks can be persuaded to follow coordinated expansionary 
fiscal and monetary policies if they can be assured that aid flows will be steady and 
predictable. Governments also need to be convinced that when aid flows do slow, they 
can sustain the programmes from domestic financing sources. For this purpose, there 
should be sustained efforts to mobilize domestic revenue. Countries might need, for 
instance, to slow down the liberalization of trade since tariffs contribute significantly to 
government revenue, especially in low-income countries.  
In order to enable the central bank to manage the exchange rate without piling up 
foreign exchange reserves (as a precautionary measure against speculative attacks on 
the domestic currency), there should be some controls on capital outflows. For most of 
the high AIDS prevalence countries, capital inflows are not significant. Instead, they 
face the problem of capital outflows (including unrecorded capital flight). The central 
bank needs to take measures to prevent the outflows of foreign currencies that are due to 
over-invoicing and other unauthorized means of capital transfers.  
Only when a country has a high inflation rate (say in excess of 20 per cent) and/or high 
government debt, can it choose to ‘absorb but not spend’ aid—namely, as a short-term 
measure to contain further demand pressure or counteract the prospects that debt will 
not be sustainable. Likewise, when a country has very low foreign exchange reserves 
and/or fears a sudden drop in aid flows, it can temporarily choose to ‘spend but not 
absorb’ aid in order to build up its reserves. 
While the above are general principles to follow, policies in each country will vary 
according to local circumstances. For instance, each country will need to determine: 
i)  the threshold levels of inflation and fiscal sustainability that set the limits of an 
expansionary policy stance;  
ii)  the process of inflation—e.g., demand pull or cost push—in order to avoid 
inflationary spirals and ill-advised policy responses;   
iii)  the income elasticity of the demand for money in order to determine the limits 
of a non-inflationary increase in the money supply; and 
iv)  factors that can enhance international competitiveness as a counterbalance to 
adverse exchange rate effects; and 
v)  sectoral employment elasticities and productivities, which can be used for 
directing public investment. 
6 Concluding  remarks 
This paper has surveyed the likelihood of macroeconomic instability due to large 
HIV/AID related foreign aid inflows. If the surge in aid flows causes high inflation 
and/or excessive real appreciation of the domestic currency, which can adversely affect   25
international competitiveness and growth prospects, then aid could be, paradoxically, 
counter-productive. This is particularly important for the countries facing both a human 
development crisis and a bleak economic prospect due to high HIV/AIDS prevalence. If 
the large aid inflows intended for HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment programmes do, 
indeed, lead to immiserization by causing macroeconomic instability, then it would 
appear, at first sight, that these countries face a ‘no-win’ situation—criticized if they 
accept and spend large amounts of aid; criticized if they don’t. 
However, as is becoming increasingly apparent, the evidence of aid induced high 
inflation and/or excessive real appreciation among developing countries is slim. 
Moreover, governments and central banks have the means to mitigate the harmful 
effects of large aid flows. They can carefully manage and coordinate fiscal, monetary 
and exchange rate policies. Furthermore, they can strategically direct public investment 
and credits to productive sectors, such as tradable-goods industries.  
Since a significant proportion of HIV/AIDS related aid will be spent abroad to buy 
drugs or medical equipment that are not produced domestically or would not be 
imported without aid, it is not likely that there would be significant inflationary pressure 
or excessive real appreciation from such spending. 
More importantly, increased spending for the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS 
will not only stem a tragic human development crisis but also will likely have 
favourable impacts on economic growth through safeguarding human capabilities. 
Effective universal programmes of treatment and prevention of HIV/AIDS can reduce, 
for example, the adverse effects of premature mortality, allowing a longer period of 
productive employment and freeing household labour from caring for sick family 
members. A major conclusion is that the human development gains from reducing 
human suffering can, indeed, be achieved without sacrificing macroeconomic stability 
and economic growth. There need be no trade-off. National policymakers have the 
policy means at their disposal to maintain stability while dramatically scaling up foreign 
assistance to stem and reverse the HIV/AIDs epidemic.  
It is the responsibility of donors to ensure certainty in aid flows so that recipient 
governments can adequately plan their programmes. This implies that government fiscal 
positions do not become vulnerable to aid volatility. At the same time, recipient 
governments must not become complacent about domestic resource mobilization 
because of a greater availability of aid. In general, they should have a clearly formulated 
and effective strategic plan to enable them to eventually exit from aid dependence. 
Acronyms 
FA  foreign aid  
GFATM  Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (of the World 
Bank and the IMF) 
LBD learning-by-doing 
MDGs  Millennium Development Goals  
PEPFAR  The President’s Emergency Plan for HIV/AIDS Relief (USA) 
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